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Abstract
Recent developments in the theory of economic growth aim at endogenising long-run
growth. The paper discusses models in which technological change arises as a by-
product of certain economic activities as well as models where some economic actions
are explicitly aimed at technological imprwements. In addition, separate sections are
devoted to the specific reconstruction of growth theory by M. Scott and models
explaining stages of economic development. For expositional purposes the algebra is
kept to a minimum. The focus is on theoretical models for a closed economy.
Empirical work is only mentioned in passing.
July, 1991
We are indebted to S. Kuipers, F. van der Ploeg and A. van Schaik for useful
comments on an earlier draft.z
1. Introduction
The recent productivity slowdown in a number of rich countries and diverging growth
performances of developing countries have led to a renewed interest in the theory of
economic growth. Neoelassic:al growth theory developed in the early sixties focussed on the
contribution of labour and capital to the process of economic expansion and change. In its
different guises, either as growth accounting (e.g. Denison 1985) or as a theory of long-run
tendencies (e.g. Solow 1970), it left much to explain. Growth accounting generates a
substantial residual, which can not be explained and is attributed to exogenous technological
change. In the theory the long-run rate of growth depends exclusively on exogenous factors
like population growth and labour-augmenting technological change.
The basic idea of the new growth theory is to endogenise the long-run rate of
economic expansion. This can be done in different ways. A first and most direct approach is
to postulate a technology with a core of reproducible capital goods that is produced without
the direct or indirect need of non-reproducible inputs or factors that are available in fixed
supply (Rebelo, 1991). Whereas this view is reminiscent of Von Neumann (1938), a second
approach finds its origin in externalities of the Marshallian type. By learning, agents take
advantage of what other agents do or have done. As a result the technology may exhibit non-
decreasing returns in the reproducible factors. A third line of research relates expansion to
some "engine of growth", which could be creation of new knowledge or R 8c D activities. The
technology in the engine-of-growth sector has the Von Neumann-Rebelo features as
mentioned above and again externalities may play a role in production. Externalities evoke
the question of internalisation in one way or the other. In the present survey we shall skip
this question of welfare economics by concentrating on the positive aspects of endogenous
growth theory.
The new developments have spread over a number of fields. Time and space prevent
us from going into a number of interesting extensions. In the first place we shau only discuss
models for the closed economy. An analysis of the impact on economic growth of
international spill-over of knowledge has to wait for another opportunity. Second, specific
aspects of development economics like endogenous population growth (e.g. Becker et al.
1990) or the specific role played by the agricultural sector will not be discussed. Finally, not
much at[ention will be paid to empirical work on endogenous growth, which is largely based
on the extremely valuable new data set by Summers 8c Heston (1984, 1988, 1991), but whích
is still in its infancy ( e.g. Romer ]989a, Barro 1991, Benhabib 8t Jovanovic 1991).
The paper is organised as follows. To set the stage and refresh the readers' mind the
essentials of neoclassical growth theory are presented in section 2. Theories with
technological change related to different forms of learning-by-doing are reviewed in section
3. Theories which assume constant returns to scale in all reproducible factors without explicit
reference to learning or other externalities fit naturally into this section. Section 4 deals with
models of intentional technological change, where certain economic activities are explicitly
aimed at the development of new techniques or skills and in this way form the "engine of
growth" oF an economy. Section 5 is dedicated to the new view on economic growth by3
Maurice Scott (1989). Finding its inspiration in the work of Kaldor this author aims at a
more fundamental reconstruction of growth theory, which leaves no place for the time-
honoured wncept of the production function. Hysteresis finds its way because in some of the
models levels of variables are path-dependent. History has a larger role to play in models
with multiple long-run growth equilibria, which are on the agenda in section 5. These models
allow for different stages of long-run economic growth. As customary the paper closes with
some conclusions and evaluations.
Finally, something has to be said on the choices made with regard to the exposition.
To make the survey easy accessible the algebra is kept to a minimum. Instead, the theories
discussed are explained by simple graphs '~. One of the features of endogenous growth
theory is that savings behaviour has an influence on long-run growth. This result applies
under a broad spectrum of hypotheses with regard to saving. In the present paper we
therefore take the liberty to model savings in a way that is most appropiate for the
presentation of the different theories. In some cases this means that we postulate a constant
macroeconomic saving ratio, while in other cases we resort to consumers who maximize an
intertemporal utility function with a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution and a
constant discount rate.
2. Neoclassical growth theory and its shortcomings
The standard tool of neoclassic:al growth theory, initiated by Solow (195G,1957) and
Swan (195G), is a production function with diminishing returns to factors when changed
separately and constant returns to scale when all factors change at the same rate. The
properties of such a function are very well known and can be easily applied to a growing
economy. For this purpose it is useful to distinguish between reproducible inputs (say
capital) and non-reproducible inputs (say labour).
Economic growth results from changes in the quantity and quality of inputs in the
production process. Households are guided by intertemporal preferences in deciding how
much to consume and how much to save. Firms maximize profits by employing labour and
capital and by expanding activities through investment. Under perfect c;ompetition all
markets clear and savings are eyual to investment. In turn, investment adds to the stock of
reproducible inputs and allows for growth in production. However, the marginal product of
capital declines as the proportion of capital over non-reproducible factors rises. In this way,
accumulation contributes less and less to growth and the long-run rate of growth in
production will tend to zero unless the quantity and quality of non-reproducible inputs rises.
Therefore a growing effective labour force compensates for diminishing returns with respect
to capital and keeps the economy gowing. In the long run the rate of growth is entirely
'~ Some technical information necessary to derive the relations depicted in the graphs is
provided in footnotes. For more formal surveys of some recent developments in the
theory of growth, see Romer (1989 a) and Sala-i-Martin (1990).4
determined by exogenous factors like population growth and labour-augmenting technological
change. Capital and effective labour then increase at the same rate, the natural rate of
growth. The rate of interest and the share of income aocruing to labour remain constant.
As observed by Jones and Manuelli (1990) there is a caveat to this story'~. If labour
and capital are easily substitutable, implying that the elasticity of substitution is larger than
unity, production may be possible without Iabour. In this case aocumulation of capital may
drive out the non-reproducible factor, so that long-run growth is no longer determined by
exogenous factors. Such a scenario seems highly implausible. It will therefore be assumed
that the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is smaller than or equal to unity.
Moreover, empirical results in estimating neo-classical production functions point in the
same direction.
With this in mind neo-classical growth theory can be illustrated by a simple graph.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production fundion and a constant rate of labour-augmenting
technological progress (gs), there is a linear relation between per capita growth of output (g-
g,) and per capita growth of capital (g~-g,.) as shown in figure 1'~. The slope of the dynamic
production function is (1-~.), where ,l equals the share of inwme accruing to labour. The
vertical intercept of the line is given bij ~lg,. The long-run rate of growth is obtained at the
intersection of the production function and a 45'-line from the origin. As can easily be
checked the long-run rate of growth of output is then equal to the natural rate of growth
(g-g,, t g„). To the left of the point of intersection output increases faster than capital, so
that for a given savings and investment ratio gK increases. To the right of the point of
intersection the situation is reversed and gK declines. It may be concluded that the model is
stable as indicated by the arrows in figure 1.
insert figure 1 the neo-classical model (exogenous growth)
The neo-classical model can explaín the stylized facts on growth as listed by Kaldor
(1961). If the labour force increases at a wnstant rate and labour-augmenting technological
change is constant, then (1) output per worker grows steadily, (2) capital per worker rises at
the same rate, (3) the average rate of return on capital is steady, (4) the capital output ratio
is constant and (5) the shares of income accruing to capital and labour are constant.
However, the way in which the model explains these facts is unsatisfactory. All long-run
growth stems from factors outside the model and economic behaviour or poliry has no
influence on the rate of growth. A change in the savings rate or a change in taxes falling on
:i In fact, Solow (1956) already stresses this point. Many of the nuances made in the
early contributions to growth theory are suppressed in later "textbook presentations"
hut are rediscovered in the recent literature on endogenous growth.
Y, - K,'' (h,L,)' where Y, K, h and L denote output, capital, the quality of lalwur
and lalmur. Differentiating with respect to time (t) and defining for any variahle x its
growth rate as g„ - (dx~dt)~x, yields the dynamic production function in the graph.
Assuming a constant savings rate o, gK is given by oY~K - o(hL~K)'. Thus dgJdt ~
gK ,1(g„ t gc - gK) which can be used to draw the arrows in the graph.5
investment have only temporary effects on economic growth. An intuitively appealing model
of growth would atlow for permanent effects of savings and taxation by endogenising
technological change.
There is even more to be said. In reality one sees large and seemingly persistent
differences in growth rates and per capita income levels, whereas the neoclassical model
predicts convergence in both variables for countries that are similar in preferences and
technology. The observed differentials can be explained by differing rates of technological
progress across countries, but again this is not fully satisfactory. Alternatively, one could
argue within the neoclassical framework that growth differences are an indication of a
transition process towards the steady state. This view is forcefully attacked by King and
Rebelo (1990) showing that for reasonable parameter values the neo-classical growth model
predicts unrealistically short transition periods. In contrast Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1990)
support the neo-classical paradigm. Taking aocount of exogenous accumulation of human
capital they show that there is a negative correlation between the growth rate of output and
the initiat level of per capita income. Although this result corresponds to the predictions of
neoclassical theory, it can be explained also in a different way. International spill-overs of
technological knowledge may lead to a catch-up of countries that lag behind the leader. An
adequate index of the technological gap is per capita income in relation to per capita income
of the leading country. As there is a fair amount of empirical support for the catch-up
hypothesis'~ we prefer this explanation of the negative correlation between growth and the
initial level of output.
3. Learning-by-doing and other causes of non-decreasing returns.
Arrow (1962) argues that labour productivity is not exogenously given, but depends
on experience in the production of commodities. A changing environment brought about by
continuous investment poses new problems and challenges, which have to be solved. This
learning-by-doing is related to cumulative investment in the Arrow model, but the
proportionate increase in labour productivity caused by the learning effect might as well be
related to the stock of capital. An important point to note is that learning is conceived as a
public good. [t is an external effect to the individual firm, because the stock of knowledge,
which is non-rival and non-excludable, is related to the aggregate stock of capitaL Labour
productivity depends on experience gained from activities in the entire economy. Therefore,
investment and the aggregate capital stock of all firms matter rather than the firms own
investment and capital stock. In this way, there may be increasing returns to scale at the level
of the economy, but firms can still be confronted with constant returns to scale. The external
effects are Marshallian, so that firms can behave competitively without incurring losses.
'i See e.g. Maddison, 1987; Abramovi[z, 1990; Scott, 19A9; Dumke, 1990; Dowrick 8t
Gemmell 1991.6
Until recently models based on learning-by-doing maintained the assumption of
decreasing returns to capital on an economy-wide level (e.g. Arrow, 1962; Sheshinsky, 1967).
The larger the aggregate capital stock per worker, the lower aré the returns to the firm's
stock of physical capital as in the neoclassical model. In this case diminishing returns are not
fully offset by increased knowledge from learning and capital accumulation contributes less
and less to growth. Only additions to the labour force (population growth) will make
economic expansion sustainable by continually raising the marginal productivity of capital,
restoring the incentive to invest and gain experience at the same time.
The Arrow-Sheshinsky model can be iDustrated along similar lines as the neoclassical
model (cf. Stern 1991). Assuming again a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital and
effective labour as inputs and a constant elasticity (y) of knowledge with respect to aggregate
capital the relation between per capita growth of output and capital is shown in figure 2 n.
The parameter .L is the elasticity of production with respect to labour at the firm level.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the elasticity of knowledge with respect to capital is smaller
than one (y ~ 1). The long-run rate of growth is obtained at the point of intersection of the
technology curve and a 45o-line from the origin. As can be deduced from figure 2 the long-
run rate of growth is equal to g- g,~(1-y). Population growth is a necessary wndition for
the growth rate of output to be positive. The long-run equilibrium is stable as can easily he
checked.
insert flgure 2 the Arrow-Sheshinsky model (learning-by-doing)
The implication of the model that the steaày state rate of growth depends upon the
growth of the labour force is unattractive. Economic growth explained in this way is still
exogenous. The long-run growth rate is determined solely by the production technology
conditions, like in the neo-classical growth model. To put it in terms of figure 1 or 2, only
one puint, the intersection uf the technology line and the 45"-line, is c:onsistent with long-run
growth. To obtain endogenous growth where besides technology conditions also savings
behaviour influences growth, there has to be a range of possible long-run growth rates for
given production technology conditions. As a prelude to model specifications which will be
given below, it may be illuminating to note how the figure can be adapted to fulfill this
reyuirement. A first way is to change the slope of the technology line in such a way that this
line coincides with the 45"-line. The models reviewed in the remainig part of this section fit
in with this procedure. Another way is to allow for shifts of the technology line, dependent
for instance on the propensity to save or to invest, which change the point of intersection
with the 45'-line and therefore the long-run growth rate. This procedure is illustrative for the
Scott model decribed in secaion 5.
Romer (1986) took up Arrow's model and showed how the growth rate can be
~ The relations depicted can easily be derived using the same procedure as in footnote
2, now taking into account that h - K', where h is to be interpreted as "knowledge".7
independent of population gowth`~. In Romer's model the gowth rate is endogenous,
because there are no diminishing returns to the stock of capital on an aggegate level. In
terms of the elasticity of knowledge with respect to the capital stock we now have y z 1. Let
the savings ratio be constant, as in the other models discussed. For the gowth rate to be
steady it must then be assumed that there are constant returns to capital (y - 1) and no
population gowth (g, - 0). Otherwise the capital coefticient will steadily decline and the
gowth rate of output will inaease for ever. Three different possibilities are presented in
figure 3. The assumptions that lead to figure 3a are y- 1 and g,. - 0. In this case the
capital coefficient (x) is wnstant and consumption, capital and output gow at the same
constant rate~. Moreover, there is no transitional dynamics in this model (see, e.g. Sala-i-
Martin, 1990). A more compGcated picture arises in the following cases. First, there is
population growth (g,, ~ 0), but returns to capital on the aggegate level are still constant (y
- 1), see figure 3b. The growth rates of output and capital now rise without any limit.
Second, the same conclusion applies in case we have increasing returns to eapital (y ~ 1)
and no population gowth (g, - 0) as shown in figure 3c"~.
insert flgure 3a,b,c the Arrow-Romer model
There is no a priori reason to believe that externalities from learning-by-doing are
large enough to compensate for internal diminishing returns to capital. Romer (1986) gives
some evidence, which could poin[ at increasing returns. Growth in the eighteenth century
was much below current gowth rates. Moreover, there are indications that rich countries
grow faster than poor countries (with a low stock of capital and knowledge). Although such
global facts are hardly conclusive the idea that diminishing returns in a dynamic world of
tearning and innovation are not dominant is appeaGng. In section 5 this idea will be taken up
again from a different angle.
Besides learning there may be other causes for non-decreasing returns to capital.
Barro (1990) introduces productive government spending as an input factor in the production
function of the private sector. The production function relating output to capital and public
expenditure is linearly homogenous. In addition, it is assumed that the government spends a
fixed proportion of output (r) on productive outlays. The combination of both assumptions
implies constant returns to capital. Capital accumulation induces diminishing returns, but
6) Much earlier, Conlisk (1967) formulated a model in which learning-by-doing, though
not explicitly labeled so, gives rise to endogenous gowth. He assumed that the
gowth rate of knowledge rises with the level of production per efficiency labour unit.
~ Replacing h- K' in the Cobb-Douglas production function (see footnote 2) gives Y
- K''~''~ L' and therefore x- K~Y - K`"'~ L'
"~ A fourth possibility is y~ 1 and g,.~0 with an intercept of ,Lyg„ no attainable
intersection of the production function with the 45"-line and again increasing gowth
rates.8
with a fixed z public expenditure rises in proportion to output. The increase in productive
government spending raises the productivity of capital to such an extent that it compensates
fully for diminishing returns to ac:cumulation considered in isolation. The Barro model fits,
therefore, into figure 3a, with the c;apital wefficient depending on the fraction of government
expenditure over output (r)"'.
There are a few additional aspects of the model worth mentioning. Profit maximizing
fums make a profit, because they capture the productive contribution of government
spending. However, the government has to finance its expenditure by taxing households.
Distortionary taxation may have a negative impact on growth if it falls on savings and
investment. In this case there is a trade-off between the distortionary effect of public outlays
through taxation and the productive effect of government spending. The optimal tax rate on
output can be found maximizing the intertemporal utility function of consumers with respect
to r taking account of the appropiate constraints. As shown by Barro (t990), the utility
maximizing tax rate coincides with the growth maximizing tax rate under rather special
circumstances'"~. When part of the tax revenue is spent on unproductive government
consumption, the distortionary effects become stronger. Which tax rate and which allocation
of public expenditure over infrastruture and consumption is optimal depends on the utility
function of the politicians. In general, there will be a trade-off between the level of (private
and public) consumption and the growth rate. Short-sighted politicians tend to choose for a
high level of consumption and a relatively hígh tax rate. Infrastructural provisions and growth
will be lower than in a situation where politicians and private agents have the same time
preference (Van der Ploeg á Van de Klundert 1991). The impact of government debt on
growth is studied by Alogoskoufis á Van der Ploeg (1991). Assuming finite lives, following
Blanchard (1985), changes in the stock of private wealth affect consumption and the savings
rate, because economic agents want to capture the fruits of their wealth before they die.
Hence, with Barro's specification of the production function, debt financing of infrastructural
provisions raises the productivity of private capital but lowers the savings rate. Taking both
effects into account, there is again an optimal share of social infrastructure.
Returning to the formal structure of these models, the basic property causing
endogenous growth is clearly revealed by Rebelo (1991). Production takes place with
constant returns to a broad concept of capital which includes capital in the traditional,
narrow, sense (private capital) and all kinds of other reproducible factor inputs (for instance
Combining the Cobb-Douglas production function Y - K'''S' where S denotes
productive government spending and the government budget rule S- rY gives Y-
K.r'~~''~ and therefore K- K~Y - r'~~' i~
'"~ Van der Ploeg 8c Van de Klundert (1991) show that this result relies on the Cobb-
Douglas specification of the production function. Assuming an elasticity of
substitution between capital and government spending less than unity, both tax rates
do not coincide.9
government spending on infrastructure as in Barro's model)"~. A more realistic description
of the production structure distinguishes also sectors where non-reproducible factors are
essential. Provided that there is a"core" of capital goods that can be produced without the
use of non-reproducible factors, the growth of sectors where capital as well as fixed factors
are needed can be fueled without bounds and growth is endogenous. In this case, there is no
need for increasing returns and Marshallian externalities as in Romer's (1986) model. This
opens up one possibility of modeling technological progress that is fully internalized by firms
and consumers, which takes us to the subject of intentional technological change.
4. Models of intentional technological change
It seems unrealistic to assume that all technological change is a side-effect of
activities that are not specifically aimed at changing the production environment. When non-
reproducible inputs are essential in the production process and the returns from additions to
the per capita stocks of these inputs fall, productivity increasing technological progress is
needed to attain long-run growth in per capita terms. To generate these productivity gains, it
is, at least to a certain extent, necessary to extract resources from production activities and
to use these resources for specific research and education (R 8r E) activities. In this view,
technical progress is not merely a by-product of economic activities, but results from the
intention to improve upon the existing situation. The allocation of resources and economic
aciivity between the production sector and the R 8c E- sector will be determined by relative
returns. The returns on R 8c E depend among other things on the rate of time preference
because there is a trade-off between current production and investment in R 8t E which
generates higher future output. Hence, economic growth is endogenous whereby the R 8i E-
sector acts as an eneine of ~, provided that the technology of this sector has the "wre"
property in the sense of Rebelo (1991). This idea is not new, but older papers employing it
seem to be forgotten, with exception of Uzawa's (1965) article. In the introduction we
already referred to Von Neumann (1938). Another rather striking example is Conlisk (1969)
who put forward a growth model that is in essence identical to Rebelo's (1991, section III)
model.
In this section we consider two models that apply the engine-of-growth approach. 1n
Thus, the simplest (one-sector) structure is Y- AK, where K denotes a broad
concept of capital (in Barro's modeL K- K'-'S'). This structure can be represented
again as in figure 3a where now x- 1~A. Note the similarity with the Harrod-
Domar model (Harrod 1939, Domar 1946), where a L.eontief fixed coefficients
production function with capital and labour inputs is assumed. As long as not all
labour can be absorbed in production, the marginal productivity of capital is constant
and in this case it resembles the Rebelo model. However, once the stock of capital
has grown large enough to employ all labour, production capacity is constrained by
the labour force. In the Y- AK-model this kind of bottlenecks caused by non-
reproducible factors does not arise ex hypothesi and exogenous growth is
circumvented.10
Lucas (1988) the output of the R~ E sector is human capital conceived as knowledge
acquired by individuals through intentional learning processes. In Romer (1987) the R 8c E
sector generates technical knowledge, which takes the form of designs for new capital goods
which are used in the production of all commodities. Before turning to the details of both
models it is useful to discuss some preliminary questions. First, in the preceding sections it
was possible to analyse the basic issues by assuming a fixed savings ratio. In the models
under review in this section such a simplification is no longer adequate, because the
allocation of factors of production between sectors and the intertemporal choice of
consumption profiles interact. Fotowing a standard procedure it will now be assumed that
consumers maximize an intertemporal utility function with a constant rate of time preference
(B) and a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion (p) (Ramsey 1928). Combining the
first order conditions for a maximum with the assumption of balanced growth one gets the
Ramsey-formula: (g-g,,) - (r-B)~p, where r denotes the real rate of interest and g denotes
the common growth rate of aggregate output and consumption. Second, in the neoclassical
model knowledge is a pubiic good, it is nonrival and non-excludable. Once an idea or, more
specific, a design for a new product or a new production technique exists, it can be applied
as often as one tikes without further costs attached. This raises a problem if knowledge has
to be created by spending on factor inputs. If ideas and designs can be freely copied, the
inventor would not be rewarded. Therefore, the fruits of investing in new knowledge should
be excludable at least to some extent, so that these investments are profitable (Romer
1990d). In the models this aspect is taken care of in different ways.
Lucas (1988) considers an economy where workers have to decide how much of their
time they want to spend on producing goods and how much time they set aside for learning
or schooling activities. R á E activities result in higher skills and ahilities of workers. By
learning workers invest in human capital, which raises their real wages. Note that knowledge
acquired in this manner is rival and excludable because it is tied to individual workers. Firms
in the Lucas-model face a neo-classical producxion function which exhibits constant returns in
capital and effective labour taken together. The workforce (effective labour) can be enlarged
by increasing the number of workers or by raising the skills of existing workers.
To allow for a steady state with growing per capita production and consumption,
human capital has to grow steadily. Following Uzawa (1965), Lucas assumes that a constant
rate of growth of human capital is attainable by devoting a constant fraction of time to R óc
E or learning as it is in this model12~. Tiiis is a disputable assumption if one realizes that
knowledge is tied to mortal workers, but it can be given some justification. Learning can be
thought of as a social activity in the sense that already existing knowledge can be passed on
to new generations. Hence, each generation of workers can assimulate new ideas inspired by
the old ones that are teached. There is no reason to suppose that the generation of Einstein
could add less than the generation of Leonardo da Vinci. In other words, there are no
diminishing returns and human capital accumulation serves as an engine of growth.
Economic growth depends on decisions taken by optimizing households and firms.
12~ Rebelo (1991) shows that it can also be assumed that various kinds of reproducíble
capital are needed for human capital formation.11
The general equilibrium results are somewhat intricate, but the steady state solution for
balanced growth can be represented by the four relations depicted in figure 4. In this
situation, the growth rate of output, capital and consumption are equal and labour
productivity increases at the same rate as human capital (g-g,. - g~-g,. - g,). The fraction of
time spent on the production of goods (u) is constant and determined along with the other
endogenous variables of the general equilibrium model. For constancy of u, there has to be
no incentive to reallocate time between production and education implying that the return to
the production of capital goods and the return to education are the same. It can be shown
that the real rate of interest then equals r- e t g„ where e is the parameter that relates
the growth rate of human capital to the fraction of time spent on education or learning (1-
u)"~. In equilibrium, the rate of return on investment equals the rate of return desired by
households (r - p(g-gi) t B), so that there is no incentive to reallocate production
between investment and consumption. T'his condition is shown in the second quadrant of
figure 4. The simultaneously determined allocation of time (in the fourth quadrant) is found
by using the engine-of-growth function, drawn in the first quadrant, as illustrated by the
dotted lines connecting the different quadrants in fgure 4. If consumers are in for a lower
rate of return the long-run growth rate of the economy will be higher. The same conclusion
applies if diminshing returns to capital are more strongly counterbalanced, that is if e or g,
are higher.
insert figure 4 the Lucas model (human capital accumulation)
It should be observed that history matters in the present model. In the steady state
the capital - effective labour ratio has to be constant. Because both the stock of physical
capital and that of human capital are endogenous, a country starting from a low level of both
factors will attain the same growth rate ultimately as a country starting from a high level of
physical and human capital, but the levels will never catch up. There is convergence in rates
of return and growth, but levels will diverge. A relatively poor country therefore remains
relatively poor.
A criticism raised against the Lucas model is that intentionally aocumulated nonrival
knowledge is neglected: education yields primarily skills which are tied to human bodies and
therefore rival. Nonrival knowledge that is passed on to future generations is viewed only as
a by-product of education (Romer 19896). In reality, nonrival knowledge is intentionally
accumulated. Scientific research and commercial development yield primarily ideas and
designs that can be employed by workers but are not necessarily tied to them.
One way to deal with growth inducing RBeD activities can be found in Romer 1987,
"~ Each consumer ma~timizes utility by choosing u and the level of consumption C
subject to the production function Y- dK~dt t C- K'~' (uhL)' and to the engine-
of-growth function dh~dt - e(1-u) h. Setting up the Hamiltonian H and using the
optimality conditions for i3H~di, aH~i3K and ijH~alt together with the condition of
balanced growth g- gK - g~ -(1-x)gK t Jl (g,.tg,) yields r- e t g,, while the
conditions for i3H~dC and aH~r7K yield, as usually, the Ramsey-formula.12
who extends Ethier's (1982) static model on specialization to a growing economy. This R óc
D growth model is used in several other papers, especially in relation to trade "~. In
Romer's version (1987, 1990a,b,c) the engine of growth is the research sector which produces
blueprints for new varieties of capital goods which are in turn produced and used in the
goods producing sector. As before there are no diminishing returns with respect to the
reproducible factors of produdion applied in the research sector. For simplicity, skilled
labour (called human capital to distinguish it from unskilled labour) is taken as the only
input and its productivity is linear in the stock of existing blueprints to emphasize that
researchers can benefit from knowledge generated by previous inventions. In this sense,
knowledge is nonexcludable for researchers. By contrast, the use of blueprints to produce
capital goods is excludable by means of patents. Hence, the fruits from RBcD can be sold and
revenue per unit of skilled labour must be large enough relative to the alternative use of
skilled labor, allocated in the production sector.
The invention of a new variety of capital or intermediate goods has a social value
because it is assumed that varieties are imperfect substitutes in the production process of
goods. A capital stock composed of many varieties yields a higher return than a capital stock
of the same size with less varieties. '[tte goods sector produces consumption goods and
intermediate goods (varieties) by applying the same technology. There are however
differences with respect to market structure. Consumption goods are sold in a competitive
market. Perfect competition would cause a problem in the market for intermediate goods. To
produce the new variety, a firm has to incur the fixed cost of a patent before starting the
production. Once the patent is acquired, production can be doubled by doubGng the rival
inputs, capital and (skilled and unskilled) labour so that there are constant returns to scale
with respect to labour and capital. As a result firms cannot pay the rival inputs their
marginal productivity as well as pay for the patent in case their product, that is the capital
good variety, is sold in a competitive market. With prices equal to marginal cost, there is no
revenue left to reward [he design. Therefore the producer of intermediate goods must have
monopoly power: then prices can be set above marginal cost to rewver the initial
expenditure on the design.
The steady state solution of the Romer model is illustrated in figure 5. The supply of
skilled and unskilled labour is fixed. The allocation of skilled labour (H) between the
commodity sector (H,.) and the R 8c D sector (Ha) is shown in the fourth quadrant. In
general equilibrium the allocation of factors of production is determined simultaneously with
the rate of interest as depicted in the second quadrant of figure 5. Here again the desired
rate of return (r - pg t B) must be equal to the rate of return on physical assets. As
appears from figure 5 the warranted rate of return is a positive function of the stock of
skilled labour (H) and a negative function of the rate of growth (g). A larger volume of
skilled labour leads to a higher input in R 8r D activities which raises the growth rate and
"~ Grossman 8c Helpman 1990, 1991; Rivera-Batiz 8c Romer 1991a, b; Romer 1990c.13
the rate of return together~. For a given volume of skilled labour the rate of gowth can be
increased only by relocating labour from the commodity sector to the R á D-sector. As a
result of such a reallocation the marginal productivity of capital goods falls, which explains
the negative relation between r and g on the supply side of the model. Furthermore, as in
the Lucas model a fall in the rate of time preference (6) or a rise in the effectivity of R 8c D
acitivities (E) lead to a higher long-run gowth rate.
insert [igure 5 the R 8c D gowth model (Romer 1987, 1990)
It should be noted, that the Romer model relies on some old economic insights. First,
it uses the Chamberlinian approach to increasing returns (Chamberlain 1933). The economy
has increasing returns with respect to labor, capital and "knowledge" taken together. By
assuming monopolistic competition, rents can be assigned to the research activities that
generate knowledge. Secondly, the model captures some features of Schumpeter's work
(1942): gowth is driven by the monopoly rents which can be obtained by the introduction of
new products, economic change is the result of purposeful activities of profit seeking
entrepreneurs. However, Schumpeter gives a much richer description of economic dynamics,
emphasizing discontinuous changes and the importance of disturbances of equilibria.
Imitation by entering competitors erodes the innovator's monopoly power. Development of
substitutes and new innovations feed the process of creative destruction. It is difficult to
capture these dynamics in a tractable formal model.'o Some recent attempts may be found
in Aghion 8c Howitt (1989) who use a variant of Romer's model. The RáD sector invents
new production techniques which make existing techniques fully obsolete. Producers shift to
this new technique and the innovator is rewarded until a new technique is found and
replaces his invention. Moreover, the returns to research efforts are uncertain and modeled
by a stochastic process. This captures the view of gowth as a discontinuous process and may
generate cyclical results.
5. Investment and technological change inseparable
T'he idea that every act of investment implies qualitative as well as quantitative
changes has a fascinating appeal. Mere redupGcation of existing production processes may be
an exception rather than a rule. It is this view which lies behind Kaldor's (1957, 1962) well-
Is)
I6)
With positive population gowth, this would imply ever rising per capita gowth rates,
as in the Arrow-Romer (1986) model, which seems somewhat implausible.
Romer (19906) and Grossman and Helpman (1990) assume imperfect substitution
between the varieties of capital so that the more varieties are available in the
economy, the less the demand for a particular variety. However, every variety stays in
production and thus there is no creative destruction in a strict sense.14
known technical progress function, which is shown in figure 6. Kaldor postulates a relation
between per capita growth rates of output and capital. This technical progress function (TPF)
was seen as an alternative for neoclassical growth theory, but despite the more or less
revolutionary intentions it turned out to be a dead end. It appeared that the linear version of
the TPF gave exactly the same results as a Cobb-Douglas production function with an
elasticity of labour equal to (1-a) and a Harcod-neutral technical progress at the rate a~(1-
{i). Moreover, even for the non-linear version the TPF gives the familiar neo-classical result
that economic growth in the long run depends only on exogenous factors. There is no
influence of the savings ratio. This can be seen by drawing a 45'-line from the origin. At the
point of intersection of this line and the TPF growth is steady (g L g,~. The long-run rate of
growth is then determined by the parameters of the TPF and by g,.. Moreover, the balanced
growth solution is stable as can easily be checked assuming a constant savings ratio.
insert tigure 6 Kaldor's Technical Progress Function
Where Kaldor failed to provide a proper alternative for the static production function
Scott (1989) succeeded by relating the relation between per capita growth of output and
capital to the investment ratio (o). Therefore, each technical progress contour (TPC)
depends on the level of gross investment over output as illustrated in figure 7a. To simplify
the exposition the TPC's are assumed to be linear. The vertical intercept depends on the rate
of capital depreciation (S). A higher gross savings rate implies more technological change,
faster changing relative prices and therefore a larger volume of capital depreciation. In the
view of Scott growth changes the economic environment. A higher level of gross investment
induces higher growth but at the expense of some existing production facilities which
depreciate in value as they are superseded by new techniques or new products. All
investment is changing the world and in a continuously changing world it makes no sense to
represent technological possibilities by a static concept like the (neoclassical) production
function. There is even no need to introduce capital, because what really counts is gross
investment, that is consumption foregone at each point in time. Capital is only introduced to
show how Scott's theory differs from Kaldor's in a formal sense, although both authors have
similar ideas about growth and change in a dynamic economy.
insert figure 7a,b the Scott model
The technological possibilities in the Scott model can be represented by investment
programme contours ([PC's). As shown in figure 76, these IPC's express how the growth rate
of output, measured per percent of current output devoted to investment, g~o, is related to
the growth rate of employment, measured in the same way, g,~o. Employment growth is
corrected for the number of hours worked and for the level of skill. It is therefore measured
in efficiency units. Investment is gross of depreciation but net of wear and tear (cf. Scott
1991). When machines or plants depreciate in value as a result of relative price changes theyis
have to be adapted or replaced to maintain the profitability of the firm '~. All investment,
including replacement of obsolete machines contributes to growth in the form of
Schumpeterian creative destruction. Each IPC shows how firms can opt for relatively more
labour-saving projects (defensive investment, to the left on the IPC, see figure 7b) or go for
relatively more expansionary programmes (offensive investment, to the right on the IPC).
Along with this strategic choice firms have to decide on the total amount of investment. A
higher investment ratio implies a higher growth rate as the opportunities for learning-tiy-
doing increase. At the same time the qualitative change c:aused by current investment in new
techniques and products creates the possibilities for further improvements by future
investment so that there is no reason for diminishing returns over time. However, there are
diminishing returns with respect to investment in each period as illustrated in figure 7b. The
higher the investment ratio the lower the corresponding IPC will be.
Firms maximize the present value of the cash flow by choosing o, g and g,, optimally
given the time path of real wages and interest rates. If labour is relatively expensive firms
will select more labour-saving projects and adapt the volume of investment accordingly. High
interest rates make investments relative unattractive. The model can be completed by
introducing utility maximizing households and assumptions with respect to market clearing.
Thc goods market clears instantaneously. Equilibrium in the lahcwr market is here defined as
the equality of the growth rates of employment and labour supply (g,, - g„). However, it is
not necessary that the volume of employment equals the volume of labour supply.
Employment and output are path-dependent variables in the model. The steady state solution
appears to be stable for different assumptions with regard to labour market clearing (see van
de Klundert and Meijdam, 1991). The complete model generates solutions for the rate of
interest, the savings~investment share and the growth rate of real wages along with a solution
for the share of income accruing to labour. 'Iite level of the real wage rate is path-dependent
as is the level of labour productivity.
Assuming a constant savings ratio (o,) and a fixed rate of growth of labour supply
(gN) the steady state solution is illustrated by point A in figure 76. A rise in the savings ratio
leads to a higher rate of growth as shown by point B, provided that diminishing returns are
not too severe "~. An increase in labour supply induces a higher rate of growth of output,
but labour productivity falls as the slope of the IPC is smatler than one (see Scott, 1989).
From an empirical point of view the Scott model gives satisfactory results, although
there seems to be a problem with respect to the explanation of the productivity slow-down
after 1973 in a number of countries. This may be due to the impact of substantial negative
demand shocks on medium-tvn growth. Whereas most theories of growth deal with the
Depreciation should be distinguished from maintenance. The former stands for
declines in the value of capital (or to avoid this word: economic arrangements)
because of economic change, the latter for expenditures to restore the physical
condition of capital. Investment and growth can offset depreciation, whereas
maintenance arising from wear and tear shows up even in a static economy.
Point B must be above the 45o-line drawn through point A. For a precise
mathematical statement of this condition see Van de Klundert and Meijdam, 1991.16
supply side only, the empirical implementation of the Scott model shows that demand factors
cannot be entirely teft out. However, the theory integrating both sides of the economy has
still to be developed 19J.
6. Multiple growth equilibria: history sets the tone.
In the real world economies may be distinguished by stages of growth as suggested by
several authors (cf. Rostow, 1961; Olson, 1982; Porter, 1990). At a low level of per capita
income countries may be caught in a low growth trap from which it is difficult to escape.
More developed countries are supposed to be in a stage of high and sustained growth. But as
these economies bec;ome more mature things may worsen and there may be a stage with
high income but a slowly growing or stagnating economy. The theory of endogenous growth
can be extended to allow for different long-run growth equilibria, which can be associated
with stages of grow[h at different points in the spectrumm~. Here we shall discuss two recent
theories, which give rise to multiple equilibria, but which are otherwise different in scope.
Stiglitz (1987) highlights the problems of countries trapped in low level equilibrium, while
King and Robson (1989) develop a model where relatively rich economies stagnate.
In the analysis of Stiglitz, it is assumed that learning depends on the capital-effective
labour ratio (k). Labour-augmenting technical progress (g,) is a positive function of k,
because when a more capital-intensive technique is employed, technologícal spillovers are
stronger and learning of technical skills is easier. The learning function is wnvex as shown in
figure 8. For simplicity, population is assumed constant. In long-run equilibrium the rate of
growth of capital must be equal to the rate of labour augmenting teehnical progress:
gK-a~x-gs. The capital-output ratio (x) is an increasing function of the capital-effective
labour ratio (k). By assuming that households find it easier to save when the rate of growth
is higher, the savings rate o is a positive function of the growth rate and [herefore also of the
capital-effective labour ratio. This gives a second relation between the growth rate and k
which is S-shaped if the increase of o is strongly dominating the increase of x for low values
of k, but weakly for high values of k. The dotted line in 6gure 8 shows the warranted rate of
growth as a function of the capital-effective labour ratio. There are three long-run equilibria
with stable solutions at points A and B.
insert figure 8 the Stiglitz model (learning to learn)
In the low-level steady state the savings rate is low because the rate of growth is low,
whereas the growth rate is low because technical progress is modest. in turn, tec:hnical
19~ cf. Van de Klundert 8c Van Schaik (1978), Stadler (1990).
m~ Earlier models with multiple growth equilibria are based on endogenous population
growth, e.g. Nelson (1956), Buttrick (1958) and Niehans (1963).17
progress is low because f"irms apply techniques with a limited learning potential. The country
is therefore trapped in a low-level equilibrium from which it is difficult to escape. The
situation is even worse if the learning capacity of the economy depends on k as well as on
current and past learning experiences. In particular, with a low level of learning capacity the
immediate bene5ts of a switch to more capital-intensive production process may be limíted
as it takes additionai time to generate sufficient leaming-experience.
In the model of King and Robson (1989) it is the high income level country that
realizes slow growth of output. Maturity induces rent-seeking, lack of motivation and
emphasis on distribution rather Ihan produdion (e.g. Olson, 1982; Porter 1990). King and
Robson assume that production per efficiency unit of labour depends on capital per
efficiency unit of labour with a constant elasticity 1-x. There is no population growth. Capital
depreciates because of wear and tear at a constant rate S. Firms invest to the point where
the marginal product of capital equals the sum of the real rate of interest and the
depreciation rate: (1-1.)~x-rtS. Technical progress, which takes the form of labour-
augmenting technological change, is assumed to depend on the rate of investment net of
depreciation (a). This represents the effect of learning-by-watching, the demonstration effect
on productivity of what is going on in the economy as a whole. Learning-by-watching is a
Marshallian e aernal effect~'~. The technical progress function of Robson and King differs in
this respect from the innovation possibility contour of Swtt, which relates iearning to the
own experience and intentions of firms. The King-Robson technical progress function is S-
shaped as shown in figure 9 by the curve g- ~p(o). At low levels of investment the
probability of contact with new ideas is supposed to be low. The growth rate increases with a
rise in the investment ratio, but beyond a certain level the demonstration effect has less
impact because of saturation effeds and limited possibilities to absorb new ideas. As these
factors gain importance it is hardly possible to raise the growth rate by investing more.
insert figure 9 the King 8c Robson model (learning-by-wa[ching)
The warranted long-run rate of growth depends on the savings ratio and the interest
rate according to the formula g- a~x - a(r t S)~(1-x). Intertemporal choice of consumers
leads to the well-known Ramsey formula: g-(r - B)~p. Combining both equations leads to
an expression for the growth rate as a function of the investment rate: g -(B t S) o ~(1 - ll
- po), which is illustrated in figure 9. Depending on the parameter values there may be
multiple equilibria. The steady state solutions at point O(zero growth) and at point A(high
growth) are stable. In contrast with the Stiglitz model the high growth rate solution is
associated with a relatively low level of the capital - effective labour ratio (k). The zero
growth equilibrium is attained for relativety 1'~ levels of k. Mature economies run the risk
of overaccumulation and stagnetion. Diminishing returns with respect to the reproducible
factor dominate in this case, causing the interest rate to fall and driving the savings ratio
down to zero.
"~ For a more general model with dynamic spillovers (learning-by-watching as well as
learning-by-doing) and multiple equilibria, see Durlauf (1991).18
The models discussed in this section are interesting attemps to model the intriguing
view of stages of growth, which may foUow each other over time in an irregular way as
economies experience major shocks and disturbances. However, the stories behind the
modeLs may reveal only part of the truth. An alternative view on the related problem of
industrialisation is given in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989a,b). Analytical work on the
decline of rich nations is in short supply. Empirical evidence nevertheless points in the
direction of a real problem, which should be tackled by the theory of economic growth.
7. Conclusions
Where does the reconstuction of the theory of economic growth leaves us ? From a
theoretical point of view there certainly has been some progress. Learning-by-doing,
increasing returns, research and development activities as well as investment in human
capital are incorporated in formal models of economic expansion. Preferences and saving
behaviour are given a proper place by acknowledging their impact on long-run growth rates.
The different models are sometimes rival, but most of the time complementary. Some
theories are relatively easy to implement empirically. Others apply distinctions between
different kinds of production activities and between different kind of investments which are
hard to trace in the real world. And yet in the latter category models often tell stories which
are plausible and illuminating. They contribute to a partial understanding of the complex
process, which is labelled economic growth.
What is lacking is an intergrated approach towards development and growth. With
respect to the work discussed in this survey the new view of Maurice Scott comes close to
such a programme at least when taken in its fuU depth and breadth. On a lower level of
abstraction the theory and descriptive analysis of Michael Porter serves a similar goal.
The tension between the analytical rigour of growth theory and the richness and
diversity of growth experience raises a serious problem. Policy prescriptions to foster
economic growth are only sensible if they have a concrete meaning. There is no need to teU
the people that savings matter for growth, even in the long run. But a pure desaiptive,
historical approach leaves people also with empty hands as shown by Baumol (1990) in his
evalution of the position in our discipline preferred and actually gained by the late Sir John
Hicks. T'he latter became famous for his analytical work, but would have preferred to have
the Nobel-prize for his work on economic history, which did not elicit much attention from
economists. Endogenous growth theory in its many guises seems indispensable for
disciplining our view on historical movements and positions held by countries in different
stages of development. Recent theoretical contributions may be useful building blocks for a
synthetic view on the prcxess of economic growth. Much remains to be done as observed by
Stern (1991) in his succinct evaluation of the theory and the challenge is fascinating.19
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List of symbols
C aggregate consumption
g growth rate of output
g, growth rate of variable x
h labour productivity or human capital per worker
H stock of skilled labour
HR, H~ skilled labour allocated in the research sector and the
production sector respectively
K, K stock of physical capital and stock of broadly defined capital respectively
k capital - effective labour ratio
L population or employment
N labour supply
r real rate of interest
S productive government spending













elasticity of knowledge with respect to aggegate capital
rate of depreciation
productivity of time devoted to education
rate of time preference
capital - output ratio
production elasticity of effective labour
production elasticity of capital at the firm level
ef(ectivety of R 8c D ectivities
coefficient of constant relative risk aversion
savings~investment rate
tax rate and fraction of output spent on productive government spending24
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Figure 7a,b the Scatt model28
Figure 8 the Stiglitz model (learning to learn)
Q
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